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Abstract — TERPS is a fault-tolerant computer design that sig-
nificantly reduces the threat of electromagnetic interference
(EMI), using hardware checkpoint/rollback-recovery. TERPS tol-
erates EMI by periodically checkpointing processor state into a
special safe-storage device. The detection of EMI invokes rollback,
which recovers processor state from a previously check-pointed
state and resumes normal execution. Rollback results in loss of
performance dictated by the EMI duration; TERPS ensures for-
ward progress of the system provided EMI events are separated
by some minimum time interval (e.g., at least 5.12µs for our proto-
type processor running at 100MHz). The performance overhead
of our mechanism is reasonable: 5–6% overhead when check-
pointing every 128 processor cycles. 
I.  INTRODUCTION
As feature sizes of integrated circuits decrease, the circuits’
susceptibility to EMI increases. Therefore, integrated circuits
will face potential failures from electromagnetic disturbances.
A wide range of techniques can be used to protect the storage
and transmission of data from EMI, but few techniques are
available to protect the processor from virtually chip-wide fail-
ures. We propose a fault tolerant processor design called
TERPS. We concede that with the assumption of availability of
EMI detectors and a small subset of control and memory logics
necessary to control checkpoint/rollback-recovery, the EMI
caused malfunctioning of the processor could be avoided.
TERPS works by backing up the processor state critical to the
correct operation of the processor periodically. It checkpoints
and stores the state into an external safe storage device that is
more tolerant of EMI. Upon the detection of the EMI, the sys-
tem automatically flushes the processor pipeline and reloads its
state from a previous check-pointed precise state retrieved from
the safe storage. This mechanism provides fault-tolerance even
under the condition that EMI induces virtually unlimited num-
ber of faults within the processor core. As long as the check-
pointed states are kept in the safe storage and they are precise,
the processor can safely resume its execution from the reloaded
check-pointed states as if the EMI did not occur at all. This
saves the processor from losing a significant portion of its data
compared to a shutdown or reboot.
II.  ARCHITECTURE
Fig. 1 shows the TERPS block diagram which includes the pro-
cessor core, safe storage, and checkpoint latches. In Fig. 1,
FCLK is the fast internal clock of the processor, and it is used
to generate a slower clock, SCLK, which triggers the check-
point and rollback events. SCLK is 128 times slower than
FCLK. A snapshot of the processor state is recorded at every
checkpoint, which is designed to occur on the falling edge of
SCLK. An EMI check is performed on the rising edge of the
SCLK to determine if it is necessary to initiate a rollback. If
EMI is detected, a rollback is initiated wherein the processor
pipeline is flushed and its state is reloaded from the safe stor-
age. After rollback, the processor resumes operation starting
from the reloaded state. By executing a checkpoint/rollback,
the disruption caused by the occurrence of EMI is minimized
and only a handful of recent results are discarded by the pro-
cessor. The discarded instructions will be re-executed, and
there will be data loss in this case. This mechanism ensures for-
ward progress of the processor as long as the EMI disturbance
is not continuous (i.e. for our prototype processor, forward
progress is assured if EMI events are separated by at least
5.12µs). However, more realistic mechanisms need to be con-
sidered. These mechanisms should ensure the data accuracy of
the safe storage, account for the speed discrepancy between the
CPU and safe storage, guarantee the valid reloaded state, and
handle precise interrupts. The designs of the multi-level safe-
storage, the check-pointed latch, and the write buffers offer
possible implementations of these mechanisms. 
The safe storage is designed using various techniques that
tradeoff speed for EMI tolerance. We solve the tighter timing
requirement of the safe storage by inserting a CPU checkpoint
latch between the processor and the safe storage to ensure that
the data is valid for a significant fraction of an SCLK cycle.
Two banks of safe storage that save the two most recent check-
pointed states ensure that at least one valid state always exists.
With the more realistic assumption that the EMI detection
delay is at most one SCLK cycle, a corrupt write caused by
EMI overwriting one bank of the safe storage is not disastrous
because rollback will always recover the older state. An older
checkpointed state will always be valid and rollback can be
performed correctly. A multiphase commit protocol that takes
precise interrupts into account is implemented by maintaining
a window of memory store instructions in a series of memory














































write buffers to delay the store data before the memory is per-
manently modified.
III.  PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Our initial prototype includes a simple 16-bit RISC designed in
house with a 5-stage in-order pipeline that is similar to the
DLX/MIPS processor [1], and safe storage memory units. We
fabricated the CPU chip using cell-based design and the safe
storage chip using full-custom design through MOSIS with the
TSMC 0.25µm and 0.5µm process technology respectively.
Fig. 2 shows photomicrographs of the chips. The prototype
CPU runs at 100 MHz. On the same die as the CPU, we imple-
mented twelve entries for each of the three write buffers to pro-
duce a better trade-off between storage requirements and
performance overhead. The rationale for this implementation is
that less write buffer entries are more likely to be filled thus
stalling the processor until the next checkpoint is taken, while
more write buffer entries require a larger safe storage space.
Our implementation avoids both of these problems. 
The checkpoint/rollback mechanism works under the
assumption that processor-wide EMI-induced faults can be
solved by reloading the processor states from the safe storage.
This method migrates most of the responsibility of tolerating
EMI to the safe storage. It is advantageous because of: 1) Off-
loading EMI tolerance requirements onto the safe storage
allows us to focus EMI tolerance techniques on a much smaller
subset of the design instead of an entire system, and 2) Less
design restrictions are placed on the processor itself. These rea-
sons make it possible to design a fast, high-performance pro-
cessor regardless of its fault tolerance mechanisms. The safe
storage is a memory that is specially designed to have signifi-
cantly better EMI tolerance than the processor by using a vari-
ety of architecture, circuit, device, and process-level
techniques. Most of these are orthogonal to each other and may
be used or left out depending on the level of tolerance required
by the system. Our design techniques compromise speed and
die area in favor of better EMI tolerance. This is possible
because of the very small size of the circuitry involved in
checkpoint/rollback. We implement our safe storage cells using
a six-transistor cell to maximize the static noise margin (SNM)
since SNM is a good measure of the amount of spurious signal
needed at the memory cell inputs to corrupt its state. The SNM
of different memory cell configurations has been studied [2],
showing that the 6T configuration is the best choice to maxi-
mize SNM if higher EMI tolerance system is needed [3, 4].
IV.  PERFORMANCE 
The configuration of our design results in an average of 5–6%
overhead. The overhead takes into account the overhead during
normal operation when no EMI is detected in addition to the
overhead caused by the stalls due to waiting for write buffer
entries when transferring data atomically to the memory con-
troller. The occurrence of EMI results in the loss of four SCLK
cycles worth of operation, or 512 processor cycles. In the 512
cycles, 356 cycles are discarded instructions in one rollback
window, while 156 cycles are for the actual rollback. For a
100MHz processor, this is equivalent to 5.12µs.  Fig. 3 shows
the performance overhead for our processor for different
checkpoint intervals, different write buffer sizes and several
different middle-sized benchmarks. For a checkpoint interval
of 128 cycles and a write buffer size of 12 entries, our overhead
is only 5–6%. The PCB has been designed and is in test.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we described a fault-tolerant processor design
that significantly reduces the EMI susceptibility of a system.
We employed checkpoint and rollback recovery, including
practical mechanisms to solve the problems caused by non-ide-
ality of the system. The performance overhead of our mecha-
nism is reasonable: 5–6% when check-pointing every 128
processor cycles. We also showed that our prototype processor
assures forward progress even in the presence of EMI, as long
as the EMI events are separated by at least 5.12 µs. 
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Figure 2: Chip die photos fabricated through MOSIS.   
(a) Processor Core (b) Safe Storage
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